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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ciency need not be sacrificed if adequate guidelines are placed
upon the right to counsel. For example, counsel could be present
to witness the proceedings, but not be allowed to interrogate wit-
nesses, or otherwise interfere with the proceedings. 48 This gen-
eral approach would protect the value of police lineups, and yet
enable counsel to make an informed objection to lineup irregu-
larities in later stages of the criminal procedure.
Evidence: Obtaining Expert Testimony of Defendant
Physician Under Adverse Witness Statute
Plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice suit alleging injury
due to the negligence of defendant in administering X-rays.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict since plaintiff had not presented any expert medical testi-
mony to the jury. On appeal, plaintiff contended that he should
have been allowed to qualify defendant as an expert and to
elicit his expert medical testimony under Minnesota's adverse
party rule.' The Minnesota Supreme Court held that plaintiff
could not require expert testimony from defendant physician.
Hoffman v. Naslund, 274 Minn. 521, 144 N.W.2d 580 (1966).
It has generally been held that one may not examine an
adverse party under the rules of cross-examination in the ab-
sence of a statute which so provides.2 When one calls an ad-
verse party as a witness he is compelled to make that party his
own witness,3 with the result that the testimony is binding and
the witness cannot be impeached. 4 However, a majority of the
states have enacted adverse witness statutes which provide that
48. The Wade decision made no reference to the role of counsel
at lineups, but it is clear that the Court's primary concern was assuring
his access to information regarding the procedures employed. The
suggestion that counsel's activities be limited is therefore not incon-
sistent with the decision.
1. Mnrx. R. Civ. P. 43.02. This rule provides that a party may
call an adverse party during trial and may interrogate him by leading
questions and impeach and contradict him on direct examination on
all material matters as if he had been called by the adverse party.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (b).
2. DeLord v. Green, 15 Del. 316, 40 A. 1120 (1894); see State v.
Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 57 N.W.2d 419 (1953); White v. Southern
Oil Stores, 198 S.C. 173, 17 S.E.2d 150 (1941.).
3. Smellie v. Southern Pac. Ry., 212 Cal. 540, 555, 299 P. 529, 535
(1931).
4. See In re Erickson, 13 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); Smellie
v. Southern Pac. Ry., 212 Cal. 540, 555, 299 P. 529, 535 (1931).
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the adverse party may be called as a witness and questioned
under the rules of cross-examination. 5 Since such witnesses
are likely to be hostile and evasive, the method of questioning
ordinarily used on cross-examination, including leading ques-
tions and impeaching the witness, is allowed.6
While all states having adverse witness statutes recognize
the right of plaintiff to call a defendant physician in a malprac-
tice action and examine him under the rules of cross-examina-
tion, many have limited the questions to those calling for state-
ments of fact.7 Thus, a physician may not be questioned as to
the accepted standards of medical practice in his community or
as to whether his actions deviated from those standards, a
matter which calls for expert opinion.8
Some of the courts which deny a party the right to elicit
expert testimony from the opposing party do so without attempt-
ing to justify their position by logic or reasoning. 9 Other
jurisdictions, in reaching the same result, base their decision on
two main arguments. First, it is unfair for the defendant to
have to prove plaintiff's case,'0 and second, a physician has a
property right in his expert opinion of which he would be de-
prived if compelled to testify." The "unfairness" argument has
been attacked on the theory that justice and expediency should
not be abandoned for the sake of maintaining the "sporting" as-
pect of trial.12  It has been pointed out that the "property
5. E.g., MAfNN. R. Civ. P. 43.02.
6. Id.
7. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913); Ericksen v.
Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L.
511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389,
237 N.W. 915 (1931); Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d
869 (1938).
8. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913); Ericksen v.
Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L.
511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389,
237 N.W. 915 (1931); Forthhofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d
869 (1938). Contra, McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp.,
15 N.Y.2d 20, 26, 203 N.E.2d 469, 473, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73 (1964).
9. Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Fort-
hofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
10. Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913), discussed in
5 S. CAL. L. R.v. 448 (1932). Contra, Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.
2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
11. See Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 517, 37 A.2d 53, 56 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1944). But see McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear &
Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
12. E.g., McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15
N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
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right" argument 3 deserves support only when the person whose
expert testimony is desired is not a party to the action. In
such cases great inconvenience and unfairness could result to
physicians called for the purpose of giving expert testimony. 14
However, when the expert is a party to the action, there is no
inconvenience. Fairness dictates that the expert party should
not have the right to remain silent if he has relevant information
for the judicial proceeding. 15 The need to cross-examine a party
who is a medical expert is particularly pressing because as a
practical matter it is difficult to obtain the attendance and testi-
mony of other physicians in medical malpractice suits.16 The
testimony of an expert in malpractice cases is vital because
most courts require expert testimony in order for plaintiff to
avoid a nonsuit. 17
Perhaps in response to these arguments, state courts which
have recently faced this issue have held that one should be able
to elicit the expert testimony of an adverse party.18 An example
of the current trend is McDermott z). Manhattan Eye, Ear and
Throat Hospital,9 where the New York Court of Appeals al-
lowed plaintiff to question defendant physician as to his expert
13. Note, Oleksiw v. Weidener: Eliciting Expert Testimony From
Defendant Doctor In a Malpractice Suit, 70 Dicx. L. REv. 394, 397-99
(1966).
14. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d
20, 29, 203 N.E.2d 469, 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73 (1964).
15. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
See McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 28,
203 N.E.2d 469, 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73 (1964). This is true only in
civil suits as a defendant in a criminal action is specifically exempted
from testifying against himself by the constitutional protection against
self-incrimination. Oleksiw v. Weidener, supra; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. See, e.g., Marrone v. United States, 355 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1966).
It is indeed difficult to expect one physician to condemn the actions of
of another physician in open court, especially when the latter is a leader
in his field. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15
N.Y.2d 20, 27, 203 N.E.2d 469, 474, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73 (1964).
17. Bryant v. Biggs, 331 Mich. 64, 71, 49 N.W.2d 63, 67 (1951); King,
The Adverse Witness Statute and Expert Opinion, 4 WAYNE L. REV.
228 (1958); see 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2090 (3d ed. 1940). In Hoff-
man, the Minnesota court required expert testimony in order for plain-
tiff to avoid a nonsuit. The standard applied in most malpractice
cases, including Hoffman, requires scientific knowledge that can be
provided only by expert medical witnesses.
18. Dark v. Fetzer, 6 Mich. App. 308, 149 N.W.2d 222 (1967); Rogot-
ski v. Schept, 91 N.J. Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (App. Div. 1966); Mc-
Dermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throa Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.
2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964); Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147,
207 N.E.2d 375 (1965); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1963).
19. 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964), rev'g 16
App. Div. 2d 374, 228 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1962).
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medical opinions. The court of appeals stated that the defendant
doctor's knowledge of the proper medical practice and his aware-
ness of any deviation from that standard in his case are as much
matters of "fact" as are the examinations he made or the treat-
ment he prescribed.20 The court further stated that the purpose
of the adverse witness statute-to permit the production of all
pertinent and relevant evidence available from the parties2 '_
is best fulfilled when plaintiff is allowed to elicit expert testi-
mony from defendant. It would be difficult to argue that the
issue of whether defendant deviated from the standard of medi-
cal practice in his community is not pertinent to a malpractice
action.2 2 In fact in the absence of such evidence, plaintiff's case
would usually be dismissed.
23
The McDermott court refused to accept the argument that
to compel defendant to testify would be unfair and inconsis-
tent with the adversary system, concluding that any detriment to
the adversary system was outweighed by the ultimate require-
ment that each case be decided on the basis of all relevant and
available material.24 The court reasoned that the main objec-
tives should be to arrive at a just decision and to use expedient
means to attain such end.25  It may well be argued that the
court in McDermott recognized that it is optimistic to expect
plaintiff to gain anything by seeling the expert testimony of
the very doctor he is charging with malpractice, but nevertheless
concluded that the decision whether to call an adverse party is
one which should rest with the plaintiff.2 6
20. In Decker v. Pohlidal, 22 Pa. D. & C.2d 631 (C.P. 1960), the
court questioned whether any distinction can be made between question-
ing the defendant doctor as to details of his examination of the plaintiff
(fact question) and his opinion, since as to the issue whether the doctor
deviated from proper medical practice in that community fact and opin-
ion are inextricably intermingled.
21. See also State ex rel. Miles v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 161, 167
A.2d 117, 119 (1961).
22. 15 N.Y.2d at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 473, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
23. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
24. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Ex-
pert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 487 (1962).
25. The court pointed out that if a defendant in a malpractice
action testifies that his conduct conformed to the required standard his
case is greatly strengthened and if he cannot so testify the plaintiff's
case is strengthened. In either case the objectives of justice and ex-
pediency are achieved.
26. Perhaps plaintiff's objectives in calling defendant under the ad-
verse witness statute are not as idealistic as they appear to be. In
McDermott plaintiff hoped to prove her case by questioning the de-
fendant as to the propriety of a corneal transplant in view of the
condition of her eyes. Plaintiff was prepared to use the defendant's
1968]
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A recent New Jersey decision 27 relied exclusively on Mc-
Dermott as standing for a more "enlightened and practical view."
Effectively overruling its prior position on this issue,28 the court
indicated that the current aim is to arrive at truth and justice
rather than to "indulge in the niceties which have so often
characterized evidence law in the past. '29 The Ohio Supreme
Court has also followed the view expressed in McDermott,
overruling its earlier decisions.3" The court stated that the pur-
pose of the adverse witness statute is to permit the production
of all pertinent evidence in order that the trier of facts might
have all information necessary to arrive at a just decision. The
court then held that the purpose of Ohio's adverse witness stat-
ute31 would best be met by following the McDermott line of
reasoning. In analyzing its prior position and those of other
states which prohibit one from eliciting expert testimony of an
adverse party the court noted that the majority of these cases do
not specify anything inherently wrong with examining the oppo-
nent as an expert and are general in their reasons for finding
that expert testimony was not intended to be included in the
statute. The Ohio court concluded that the only real basis for
its prior holding on the issue was that it would not be fair or
sporting to allow plaintiff to force defendant to become his ex-
pert. The court, in overruling its prior decisions, rejected the
"unfairness" argument asserting that the question should not be
one of fairness to the parties but rather one of fairness to soci-
ety.3 2 The court reasoned that since the withholding of relevant
testimony obstructs the administration of justice, the duty to
testify is owed to society, not to the parties in a specific lawsuit.
The Ohio court also noted the absence of any statutory language
which required the exclusion of expert testimony. The court
authoritative text on the subject to induce him to give favorable testi-
mony.
27. Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 N.J. Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (App.
Div. 1966).
28. The Rogotzki case dealt with the right to elicit expert testi-
mony from defendant physician during discovery, not at the trial stage.
However, in persuasive dicta the New Jersey court stated that if it was
called upon to reconsider the issue decided in Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L.
511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944), a decision relied on by the
Minnesota court in Ericksen, it would overrule the Hull case since its
decision was somewhat less than an enlightened one.
29. 91 N.J. Super at 148, 219 A.2d at 432.
30. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965)
overruling Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941)
and Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
31. Omo REv. CoDE A . § 2317.07 (Baldwin 1964).
32. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940).
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thus concluded that a party may be examined as to all relevant
matter in issue when called under an adverse witness statute,
regardless of whether expert testimony is involved.
On at least two occasions federal courts have been asked to
decide whether expert testimony may be elicited under Rule
43 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33 In Thompson v.
LilleheV4 the Eighth Circuit refused to rule on the issue, reason-
ing that plaintiffs had failed to show prejudice in the court's
failure to allow them to elicit the expert testimony of defendant.
Similarly, in Marrone v. United States35 the Second Circuit re-
fused to decide the question because plaintiffs had made no offer
of proof and thus could not establish any prejudice in accord-
ance with Rule 43 (c).31 Federal courts have been faced with the
issue on numerous occasions in connection with questioning dur-
ing discovery proceedings, and appear to be equally divided.
3 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court was first presented with
the issue in Ericksen v. Wilson.38  The court held in Ericksen
that plaintiff could not use the adverse witness statute to elicit
expert testimony under the guise of cross-examination. The
court stated its approval of the Idaho court's position3 9 that if
plaintiff desires to make his case by expert evidence from de-
fendant himself, he must call him as his own witness. How-
ever, it should be observed that if plaintiff had to call defendant
as his own witness it would effectively preclude any attempt by
plaintiff to cross-examine him. 40 The Minnesota court, however,
stated its conclusion without supporting argument or reasoning,
relying on the rulings in the majority of jurisdictions which had
previously considered the issue.41
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (b); MnqN. R. Civ. P. 43.02 is very similar.
34. 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959).
35. 355 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1966).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (c) provides that: "In an action tried by a
jury, if an objection to a question propounded to a witness is sustained
by the court, the examining attorney may make a specific offer of
what he expects to prove by the answer of the witness." (Emphasis
added.) It should be noted that this rule is the same as MINN. R. Civ.
P. 43.03. It is indeed difficult to see where an offer of proof is made
mandatory by this rule.
37. Compare Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957), and
Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947),
with Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), and
Olsen v. St. Anthony Mach. Prods. Co., 18 F.R.D. 313 (D. Minn. 1955)
Cf. Mng. R. Civ. P. 26.02 (prohibits discovery of expert opinion).
38. 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
39. Osborne v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913).
40. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
41. See Osborne v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913); Wiley
19681
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In Hoffman, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that
since the jurisdictions on either side of the question are still
roughly equal it was not inclined to take a position contrary to
Ericksen. However, if the court is relying solely on outstate
law, the outcome in Hoffman is questionable. Without excep-
tion, every state court which has been faced with this issue since
Ericksen has allowed plaintiff to elicit the expert testimony of
an adverse party, even if such holding necessitated overruling its
prior position.42 Thus if the Minnesota court is relying on out-
state law it should have recognized that the outstate law at
present is not the same as when Ericksen was before the court;
there has been a distinct trend away from the Ericksen result.
Before stating its holding in Hoffman the Minnesota court
mentioned that no offer of proof was made by plaintiff to dis-
close or indicate the type or degree of proof that he was seeking
to establish by calling defendant as an adverse witness. This
conceivably might be taken to indicate that if the court is again
faced with this issue and an offer of proof has been made, then
the eliciting of expert testimony from defendant would be al-
lowed. The requirement of an offer of proof has been considered
and correctly rejected by at least one state court 43 which held
that questioning a party under the adverse witness statute is
often exploratory and thus it would not be reasonable to re-
quire an offer of proof from the questioning party.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously stated that a
plaintiff may prove his case by cross-examination of the defend-
ant.44 It has also acknowledged the fact that the adverse witness
v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Forthofer v. Arnold,
60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938); 'Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511,
37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear
& Throat Hosp., 16 App. Div. 2d 374, 228 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1962), rev'd,
15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).
42. With the exception of North Dakota, see Hunder v. Rindlaub,
61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931), and Idaho, see Osborne v. Carey, 24
Idaho 158, 132 P. 967 (1913), where the issue in question has not been
presented to these respective state court3 since Ericksen was decided,
the states relied on in Ericksen have abandoned their prior position and
now allow plaintiff to elicit the expert testimony of defendant to use a-
a basis for a malpractice action against him. See Rogotzki v. Schept,
91 N.J. Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (App. Div. 1966); McDermott v. Man-
hattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.
2d 65 (1964); Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375
(1965). See also Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1963).
43. Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944).
44. Bylund v. Carrol, 203 Minn. 484, 281 N.W. 873 (1938); see
Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Hull v. Plum,
131 N.J.L. 511, 517, 37 A.2d 53, 56 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
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